ResearchMy research explores how our thoughts about the world are structured, using tools from the philosophy of language, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and logic. I am currently working on two main projects.
The first, The Structure of Uncertainty, challenges the orthodoxy about attitudes of confidence, or credences. I argue for the position I call cognitivism, according to which credences just are ordinary beliefs about epistemic probabilities. Though the epistemologies of credences and beliefs are often pursued independently and are sometimes seen to be at odds, cognitivism about the structure of credences allows for a unified theoretical grounding for the two projects. My other project, Cognitivism(s), explores the similarities and differences between the views across philosophical subdisciplines that have been or could reasonably be called ‘cognitivism’. These include the cognitivism about uncertainty just mentioned, as well as more influential cognitivist views about moral judgment and intentions, and the similar view called ‘desire-as-belief’. Though they are usually explored in different subfields, I argue that they are all fundamentally theses about the mind, which share the claim that the target state of mind – credence, moral judgment, intention, or desire – is a belief with a characteristic sort of content. Since these versions of cognitivism are structurally analogous, they share many advantages and disadvantages, and it is salutary to investigate them together. |
Publications
Uncertainty and Intention. (2023). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 25(3), 580-607.
Speakers typically use the sentence “I will go to the store” to simultaneously express an intention to go to the store and a belief that they will go to the store. This is consonant with two popular theses about intentions: first, intending to φ implies believing that one will φ; second, intending to φ commits one to φ-ing. In this paper, I argue that at least one of these theses is false. I do so by exploring what speakers express when they utter a sentence with a slightly different form, like “I will probably go to the store” in a typical situation. After laying down a framework for thinking about this sort of communication, I explore some different things speakers might express with this sentence in different situations. Most importantly, I argue that in some typical situations speakers express either ordinary intentions but not beliefs or partial intentions that don’t commit them to performing the intended action. Either way, at least one of the popular theses is false. Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality. (2023). Erkenntnis. It is often claimed that credences are not reducible to ordinary beliefs about probabilities. Such a reduction appears to be decisively ruled out by certain sorts of triviality results – analogous to those often discussed in the literature on conditionals. I show why these results do not, in fact, rule out the view. They merely give us a constraint on what such a reduction could look like. In particular they show that there is no single proposition belief in which suffices for having a particular credence, regardless of one’s evidence. But if we allow such propositions to vary with evidence – as we should – then the results do not rule out a reduction. So, at least on this count, credences might very well just be beliefs about probabilities. Imprecise Credences and Acceptance. (2022). Ergo, 9(8), 200-229. Elga (2010) argues that no plausible decision rule governs action with imprecise credences. I follow Moss (2015a) in claiming that the solution to Elga’s challenge is found in the philosophy of mind, not in devising a special new decision rule. Moss suggests that in decision situations that involve imprecise credences, we must identify with a precise credence, but she says little about identification. By reflecting on the common conception of identification and on what is necessary for Moss’s solution to succeed, I argue that identifying with a precise credence is fundamentally accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992; Cohen 1989) a proposition about probabilities. The norm on action with imprecise credences is then a special case of the general norm on action and acceptance. I delineate a number of attractive features of this position. Quantificational Attitudes. (2021). The Journal of Philosophy, 118(11), 585-613. The literature contains a popular argument in favor of the position that conditional attitudes (especially intentions and desires) are not simple attitudes with conditional contents but, rather, have a more complex structure. In this paper I show that an analogous argument applies to what we might call quantificational attitudes - like an intention to follow every bit of good advice I receive or a desire to get rabies shots for each bite I incur from an infected bat. The conditions under which these attitudes are satisfied and thwarted are not captured by claiming that they are simple attitudes with quantificational contents. So, the argument supports a novel position - that quantificational attitudes have a more complex structure. After sketching the form of this extra structure, I show how similar considerations count in favor of the existence of genuinely quantificational speech acts. Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes. (2021). Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(1), 62-79. I generalize the notion of a conditional attitude, by bringing together two topics of inquiry. One is the ordinary inquiry into conditional attitudes. The other topic is the inquiry into the attitude of thinking that a proposition is likely, or having a high credence in a proposition. For instance, what is it to intend to go to the game if it is likely that Kershaw pitches? Being likely that Kershaw pitches is the condition of the attitude. Given a natural position about statements like “It is likely that Kershaw pitches”, the target attitude looks different from ordinary conditional attitudes. Noncognitivism and the Frege-Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology. (2021). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 102(1), 184-208. This paper makes explicit the way in which many theorists of the epistemology of uncertainty, or formal epistemologists, are committed to a version of noncognitivism—one about thoughts that something is likely. It does so by drawing an analogy with metaethical noncognitivism. I explore the degree to which the motivations for both views are similar and how both views have to grapple with the Frege-Geach Problem about complex thoughts. The major upshot of recognizing this noncognitivism is that it presents challenges and opportunities not only in the philosophy of mind and language but also in epistemology itself. I present some examples where attention to the implicit noncognitivism in formal epistemology has affected or should affect epistemological theory. And I suggest that it is likely that further examples of this sort will arise. What Might but Must Not Be. with Stephen Finlay. (2020). Analysis, 80(4), 647-656. We examine an objection to the popular QA analysis of epistemic possibility modal terms, like ‘might’ and ‘may’, as existential quantifiers over possibilities. In certain contexts, claims that a proposition “might” be the case appear felicitous although, according to QA, they are necessarily false, since there are no possibilities in which the proposition is true. We defend QA by advancing a pragmatic explanation of such cases, relying on the fact that ‘might’-sentences are standardly used to convey that the speaker takes a proposition as a serious option in reasoning. Our account explains both why it makes sense to utter these sentences despite their being literally false and why their falsity is easily missed. Linguistic Disobedience. with David Miguel Gray. (2020). Philosophers' Imprint, 20(21), 1-16. There has recently been a flurry of activity in the philosophy of language on how to best account for the unique features of epithets. One of these features is that epithets can be appropriated (that is, the offense-grounding potential of a term can be removed). We argue that attempts to appropriate an epithet fundamentally involve a violation of language-governing rules. We suggest that the other conditions that make something an attempt at appropriation are the same conditions that characterize acts of civil disobedience. Accounting for attempts at appropriation is thus both a linguistic and socio-political endeavor. We demonstrate how these two facets of attempts at appropriation also help us understand the communicative features of civil disobedience. Evaluating the Multiple Proposition Strategy. (2020). Ratio, 33(3), 163-172. Contextualism about many expressions faces a common objection: in some discourses it appears that there is no single interpretation which can explain how a speaker is justified in making her assertion and how a hearer with different information or standards is justified in negatively evaluating what the speaker said. According to the Multiple Proposition Strategy, contextualists may attempt to explain these competing features pragmatically in terms of different propositions in play. In this paper I argue against the Multiple Proposition Strategy, first focusing on epistemic modals and then generalizing the results to other expressions. I show how when purportedly contextualist terms are embedded in belief reports, we get similar problems but that the Multiple Proposition Strategy does not provide a satisfactory explanation of such cases. I suggest, therefore, that we reject the Multiple Proposition Strategy in favor of a theory that explains the unembedded and embedded cases in similar ways. [link to a reply from von Fintel and Gillies to a distant ancestor of this paper with a similar main argument] Might-Beliefs and Asymmetric Disagreement. (2019). Synthese, 196(11), 4775-4805. What we can call asymmetric disagreement occurs when one agent is in disagreement with another, but not vice-versa. In this paper, I give an example of and develop a framework for understanding this phenomenon. One pivotal feature of my example is that one of the agents in the scenario has a belief about what might be the case – a might-belief. I show that a traditional account of might-beliefs and disagreement cannot explain the initially surprising phenomenon of asymmetric disagreement. In order to provide an explanation, I develop a dynamic account of might-beliefs and a corresponding account of disagreement. I close by exploring a choice point for our account – showing that the simple dynamic account has some controversial (though, perhaps, true) consequences. I explore how revisionary notions of validity, inconsistency, and disagreement can allow us to avoid these consequences if we wish. A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences. (2017). Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 4(2), 27-59. In this paper, I present an argument for a rational norm involving a kind of credal attitude called a quantificational credence – the kind of attitude we can report by saying that Lucy thinks that each record in Schroeder’s collection is 5% likely to be scratched. I prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem, which constitutes conditional support for the norm. Though Dutch Book Theorems exist for norms on ordinary and conditional credences, there is controversy about the epistemic significance of these results. So, my conclusion is that if Dutch Book Theorems do, in general, support norms on credal states, then we have support for the suggested norm on quantificational credences. Providing conditional support for this norm gives us a fuller picture of the normative landscape of credal states. Probabilistic Consistency Norms and Quantificational Credences (2017). Synthese, 194(6), 2101-2119. In addition to beliefs, people have attitudes of confidence called credences. Combinations of credences, like combinations of beliefs, can be inconsistent. It is common to use tools from probability theory to understand the normative relationships between a person’s credences. More precisely, it is common to think that something is a consistency norm on a person’s credal state if and only if it is a simple transformation of a truth of probability (a transformation that merely changes the statement from one about probability to one about credences). Though it is common to challenge the right-to-left direction of this biconditional, I argue in this paper that the left-to-right direction is false for standard versions of probability theory. That is, I make the case that there are consistency constraints on credal states that are not simple transformations of truths of standard versions of probability theory. I do so by drawing on a newly discovered type of credal attitude, a quantificational credence, and by showing how the consistency norms on this attitude can't be represented as simple transformations of truths of standard versions of probability theory. I conclude by showing that a probability theory that could avoid the result would have to be strikingly different from the standard versions - so different that I suspect many would hesitate to call it a theory of probability at all. Quantificational Credences (2015). Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(9), 1-24. In addition to full beliefs, agents have attitudes of varying confidence, or credences. For instance, I do not believe that the Boston Red Sox will win the American League East this year, but I am at least a little bit confident that they will - i.e. I have a positive credence that they will. It is also common to think that agents have conditional credences. For instance, I am very confident - i.e. have a conditional credence of very-likely strength - that the Red Sox will win the AL East this year given that their pitching staff stays healthy. There are good reasons to think that conditional credences are neither credences nor some combination of credences. In this paper, I show that similar reasons support thinking that agents have what we can call quantificational credences - attitudes like, thinking that each AL East team with a healthy pitching staff is at least a little bit likely to win the division - which are neither credences, conditional credences, nor some combination thereof. I provide a framework for assessing the rationality of credal states which involve quantificational credences. And I give a general picture of credal states that explains the similarities and differences between ordinary, conditional, and quantificational credences. Simple Contextualism about Epistemic Modals is Incorrect (2014). Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 3(4), 252-262. I argue against a simple contextualist account of epistemic modals. My argument, like the arguments on which it is based (von Fintel and Gillies 2011 and MacFarlane 2011), charges that simple contextualism cannot explain all of the conversational data about uses of epistemic modals. My argument improves on its predecessors by insulating itself from recent contextualist attempts by Janice Dowell (2011) and Igor Yanovich (2014) to get around that argument. In particular, I use linguistic data to show that an utterance of an epistemic modal sentence can be warranted while an utterance of its suggested simple contextualist paraphrase is not. Taking ‘Might’-Communication Seriously (2014). Analytic Philosophy, 55(2), 176-198. In this paper, I show that, given seemingly plausible assumptions about the epistemic ‘might’ and conditionals, we cannot explain why in some circumstances it is appropriate to utter conditional ‘might’-sentences, like “If Angelica has crumbs in her pocket, then she might be the thief” and not the corresponding simple ones, like “Angelica might be the thief.” So, one of our assumptions must be incorrect. I argue that the root of the problem is an umbrella thesis about the pragmatics of ‘might’-communication - one that says that the communicative impact of an utterance of a ‘might’-sentence is the performance of a consistency check on the information of the context. I conclude that we must reject this thesis. And I close the paper by sketching an alternative view about what assertive uses of ‘might’-sentences typically do - one which avoids the problem. Such uses typically present a possibility as a serious option in reasoning and deliberation. |
Papers In Progress
Confidence, Belief, and Rational Norms
Are Credences Thoughts about Probability? A Reply to the Inscrutable Evidence Argument Cognitivisms Toward a Theory of Quantificational Probability |
Dissertation
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